Search and Seizure

To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must, among other things, “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The purpose of this particularity requirement is to prevent

“a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); see generally Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1965) (describing the history and purpose of the particularity requirement).

A sufficiently particular warrant describes the items to be seized in such a manner that it leaves nothing to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).

Although a reviewing court ordinarily would begin by asking whether the warrant adequately particularized the items to be seized, it need not answer that question if the evidence is admissible anyway under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).

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Unlawful Arrest, Stops, and Consensual Encounters

The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” In reading the Amendment, courts are guided by “the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing,” Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995), since “[a]n examination of the common-law understanding of an officer’s authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, consideration of what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable,” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980) (footnote omitted). Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001).

Probable cause for arrest

The probable-cause standard “applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance’ the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979). If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.

“Terry” stop and frisk

When an officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, the officer may briefly stop the individual to investigate and may frisk the person for weapons if the officer reasonably believes the person is armed and dangerous. This is known as a “Terry stop and frisk.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Consensual encounters

Officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion); id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that such interactions in airports are “the sort of consensual encounter[s] that implicat[e] no Fourth Amendment interest”).

Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991). If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002).

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Bivens and § 1983 Claims for Fourth Amendment Violations

Individuals may sue state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal officials under Bivens. Both allow a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).

Qualified immunity

Government officials performing discretionary functions, however, generally are granted qualified immunity and are

“shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).

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The Exclusionary Rule for Some Fourth Amendment Violations

The exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the erroneous information resulted from clerical errors of court employees. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.

Whether evidence should be excluded, however, is a separate issue from whether the Amendment has been violated. The Amendment does not expressly preclude the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and exclusion is appropriate only where the rule’s remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.

In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court found no sound reason to apply the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring misconduct by judicial officers responsible for issuing search warrants. The exclusionary rule was historically designed to deter police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees. See id. at 916; Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).

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Miranda Warnings

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation can be admitted in evidence. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000).

Two constitutional foundations

The Court’s cases recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process test takes into consideration “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” The Court never abandoned this due process jurisprudence and thus continues to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily.

But the Court’s decisions in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and Miranda changed the focus of much of the inquiry into the admissibility of suspects’ incriminating statements. In Malloy, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to the States. 378 U.S. at 6–11. The Court decided Miranda on the heels of Malloy.

Why custodial interrogation is different

In Miranda, the Court noted that the advent of modern custodial police interrogation brought with it an increased concern about confessions obtained by coercion. 384 U.S. at 445–58. Because custodial interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual, the Court stated that

“[e]ven without employing brutality, the ‘third degree’ or [other] specific stratagems, … custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”

Id. at 455.

The Court concluded that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be “accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment … not to be compelled to incriminate himself.” Id. at 439. Accordingly, the Court laid down “concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.” Id. at 442.

The four warnings

Those guidelines established that the admissibility of any statement given during custodial interrogation depends on whether the police gave the suspect four warnings—what are now known as “Miranda rights.” A suspect must be told that he:

1. has the right to remain silent;
2. anything he says can be used against him in a court of law;
3. has the right to the presence of an attorney; and
4. if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. at 479; Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434–35.

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